Political institutions and the social anchoring of the vote

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Abstract:

"Cleavage-voting" – the extent to which voters' membership in stable social groups leads them to choose parties that are politically aligned with those groups – seems to have experienced a significant decline in Western democracies, which has been generically linked to several consequences of social modernization. However, this emphasis on the search for general trends has left a blind-spot in the literature. Why do the constituencies of parties in some democracies turn out to be more socially heterogeneous than in others? Or to put differently, why is voting more deeply social anchored in some countries than in others? In order to answer that question, we start, first, by discussing problems in the measurement of cleavage-voting. Second, adopting a measure proposed by Huber (2011) and using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems surveys, we test several hypotheses concerning how the social anchoring of vote in different political systems might be related to the incentives provided by political institutions, consequences of social modernization, and the timing of democratization.

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1. Introduction

To what extent does the fact that different individuals share certain important social, demographic or group-membership features makes them likely to make similar vote choices? How much are those vote choices and the party system configuration that results from them anchored in measurable social features of voters? There are at least three main things that, in the last decades, electoral researchers have established in what regards these questions. First, there seems to have been a point in time in the history of (at least some) democracies when the answer to the questions in the previous paragraph was "a lot". Famously, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) suggested that social cleavages along religious, class and other lines have, in historically contingent combinations, contributed during democratization processes to define social groups of voters with conflicting interests and values, as well as corresponding party labels and organizations representing those groups. Such alignments between voters and parties were made stable both through political socialization and parties' organizational linkages to society, particularly through the role of unions and organized religion. By the time Lipset and Rokkan wrote, those alignments seemed to have become "frozen", a diagnostic confirmed by immediately subsequent works (Rose and Urwin 1969).

Second, it seems that, as "social cleavage theory" was being proposed, this supposedly frozen ground was already thawing. The signs became clear since the early 1970s and have accumulated with time. The most telling and synthetic indications were the increases in electoral volatility detected in Western democracies (Pedersen 1979; Budge 1982; Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2002) and the declining importance of social membership variables as predictors of vote choices in studies based on post-election surveys. To be sure, the latter diagnostic is not entirely unanimous. Many have shown that several fundamental markers of one's resources, values and interests continue to be or have even increasingly become – as in the case of gender - significant correlates of the vote in several countries (Manza and Brooks 1998; Evans 1999; Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza 2006). However, when we move our attention from the effects of particular variables to our overall ability to explain vote choices in elections, most of the available evidence points to the notion that our knowledge of respondents' occupational status, organizational memberships, religious affiliation, and religiosity, for example, has become decreasingly useful to account for the variety of choices made by voters. Whether one treats vote as a choice between a party of the left and a party of the right (Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984; Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; Oskarson 2005), as a discrete choice without any pre-imposed uni-dimensional left-right structure (Nieuwbeerta and De Graf 1999; Dalton 2002; Brug 2010), or both (Franklin 2009), the observed trend is, generally speaking, one of declining explained variance by models of vote choice.

The third basic finding that results from this literature is that the extent to which the vote is socially anchored seems to vary widely between political systems, independently of any underlying trend of decline. All of the above-cited studies that detected a "decline in cleavage politics" have also detected such cross-national variations. They have been less successful, however, in finding explanations for them. Much of the difficulty arises from the limited sources of data that have been available so far. Until the emergence of projects such as the *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems* (CSES), available evidence about the "strength of cleavage politics" was limited to a restricted number of comparatively well-studied advanced electoral democracies with an established tradition of national election studies. Although such "most similar systems" design was well suited to the detection of trends over time in a particular set of countries, it was less well suited for the explanation of cross-national differences. And even where such variations did exist in the studied countries, the degrees of freedom available to scholars wishing to test hypotheses in any systematic fashion remained small.

However, a few notions about this have already been subjected to some empirical examination. Two main ideas have been advanced. The first is that *social modernization* is the main factor driving the extent to which voting can be more socially anchored in some countries than in others. To the extent that social modernization may have contributed to disturb previous alignments between parties and social groups, causing a decline in the social anchoring of the vote in modern democracies (Dalton, Flanagan. and Beck 1984; Clark and Lipset 2001; Dalton 2002; Norris 2002), it is conceivable that more economically developed countries turn out to be the ones where cleavage-voting is weaker. The second main idea is that *institutional rules* shape cleavage-voting. As Kitschelt puts it, vote decisions are "refracted" by institutional rules "that codify in a democracy what preference articulations count (votes) and how they count in the choice of representative bodies and executives" (Kitschelt 2010: 661). In other words, political institutions are likely to matter for the extent to which stable alignments between voters and parties are formed. For example, when electoral systems are less permissive regarding the entry of new parties and when politics are governed by a "winner-take all" logic – as it occurs in so-called "majoritarian democracies" (Lijphart 1984 and 1999) - one should expect little opportunities and incentives for parties to adopt narrow appeals aimed at mobilizing particular social segments of the electorate. However, even these basic and apparently sensible propositions about the effects of social modernization or electoral rules remain contentious. In a broad comparison of 37 elections in 32 countries, also using CSES (module 1) data, Norris (2004) found that, on average, cleavage-voting was *stronger* (rather than weaker) in post-industrial democracies, while, indeed, proportional systems were associated with greater cleavage voting. However, comparing 43 countries, using data from CSES and other surveys, Huber (2011) found that, countering all expectations, ethnic voting is actually less (rather than more) prevalent in PR electoral systems than in majoritarian systems. It seems, therefore, that a lot remains unclear about that explains cross-national differences in the social anchoring of the vote.

This paper tries to take advantage of the CSES data in order to address these and other sources of variations in the relationship between the social characteristics of voters and their vote choices in a relatively large – albeit if only in comparison with most previous studies - number of democracies and elections. It provides, as far as we know, the first multivariate and multilevel analysis of the causes of variations in cleavage-voting across countries. We proceed as follows. The next section – section two – discusses measurement problems. Studies of the social anchoring of the vote have remained a battleground between perspectives that focus on the strength of the relationship between specific social/group membership variables and the vote and those that focus on the overall relevance of social differences to vote choices. It is a battleground between what some have described as, respectively, sociological and political science traditions (see Franklin 2009 and 2010). In this paper, our basic research question is clearly linked to the latter tradition. However, even within this generic line of inquiry, many different analytical and methodological choices need to be made, especially in what concerns the manner in which the impact of social variables on the vote can be gauged. In this paper, we present and follow Huber's (2011) approach to the problem, which was originally developed to the study of ethnic voting.

In the third section, in a first stage of the empirical analysis, we estimate indices that capture the extent to which, in a particular national election, an individual's vote choice can be predicted by simply knowing things like that individual's gender, whether he or she belongs to a union, his or her socio-economic status or his or her frequency of religious attendance. Then, in the second stage, we test hypothesis about the kind of fundamental structural system-level that affect whether the social anchoring of the vote may be deeper in some countries than in others. Section three examines the impact of these institutional factors, as well as of additional macro-level variations that, as we shall explain, are also likely to be consequential. Section four concludes.

2. Measuring the social anchoring of the vote

2.1 Problems

Assessing the social anchoring of the vote for the purpose of comparing countries or comparing elections across time has been done in a variety of different ways. One possibility consists on coding the dependent variable – the vote – in some way that is comparable across countries and elections, regress it in each country on independent variables capturing social characteristics of voters – like occupation, union membership, income, gender, and so on – and use the variance explained by that model as a measure of the social anchoring of the vote. So, for example, in Franklin (1992), the crucial dependent variable is a dummy measuring "left voting", regressed on a core set of other dummy socio-demographic variables using a linear probability model, with the R-squared of those models generically interpreted as a measure of the strength of cleavage-voting. Norris (2004) does a similar analysis, but this time coding the dependent variable as an ordinal measure (with lower values for parties from party families furthest to the left and higher for those furthest in the right).

Discounting the issues involved in the use of linear probability models, which are unlikely to be of great relevance when the main concern is to assess explained variance, there are, nonetheless, three main problems with this approach. The first is that it imposes a unidimensional left-right structure on vote choices. Conceivably, there are cases where one might expect that most of what there is to capture about the impact of a particular socio-demographic variable can be gauged in this manner. For example, in most Western democracies, the impact of union membership on the vote can probably be well gauged by testing the extent to which belonging to a union makes voters opt for a Communist, Socialist or Social-Democratic party instead of a Liberal, Christian Democrat or Conservative party, for example. However, such unidimensionality may work less well in other democracies where alignments between parties and voters may have developed in other historically contingent ways or where the concepts of "right, "left" and "party family" are more fluid and indeterminate. Furthermore, even in Western democracies, while the assumption of "left-right unidimensionality" may work reasonably well when examining the effects of, say, union membership or religiosity on the vote, it is much less clear that it captures well the relevant difference between the choice sets when trying to examine the consequences on the vote of being, say, a woman, a farmer, or a member of a particular ethnic group.

The second (and related) problem with this approach is over-aggregation. Take the example of Portugal. In the 2002 legislative elections, five main parties competed for votes: the Communist Party (PCP); the Leftist Bloc (BE, a left-libertarian party created in the late 1990s); the Socialist Party (PS), a social-democratic party member of the Socialist International; the Social Democratic Party (PSD), a center-right party member of the European People's Party; and the Social and Democratic Center-Popular Party (CDS-PP), a conservative party. It is a very straightforward task to code these parties and the votes for them into "Left" and "Right" options. Either if we look at party families or at the average self-placement of voters for each party in a left-right scale, PCP, BE and PS are clearly "left", while PSD and CDS-PP are clearly "right". If we regress a "left vote" dummy variable on independent variables such as gender, union membership, religiosity, and social class, we will find that, although overall explained variance is very low (.05), union members are significant less likely to vote for parties in the right, while regular church attendants are more likely to do so. So far, so good.

Say, however, that instead of dichotomizing the dependent variable, we make use of the full information provided by the vote recall question, distinguishing between individuals who voted for the different parties? To appreciate the consequences of that, I ran a multinomial logit model, where the independent variables were the same as in the previous one but treating the vote as a discrete choice and the Communist Party as the reference category. What do we find? First, that union membership is mostly important in explaining the differences between voters in *two parties of the left*, the Communist and the Socialist Party. Socialist Party voters are much less likely to be union members than voters for the Communist Party. In fact, the size of that effect in this case is *larger* that the comparable one in what concerns explaining why voters choose a party on the right instead of choosing one on the left. Second, the effect of regular church attendance is again very large in what concerns explaining the contrast between PS and PCP voters, almost as large as in explaining the contrast between leftist and rightist voters. In other words, dichotomizing outcomes in terms of left-right lead us, in the case of the Portuguese 2002 elections, to underestimate important effects of the social characteristics of voters and their contribution to explain variance in vote choices *within* the leftist bloc, especially between the PS and PCP, two parties that represented, in the 2002 elections, almost half of the valid vote.

The loss of information caused by the imposition of unidimensionality and overaggregation of party choices may ultimately lead us to biased estimates of the extent to which a particular political system is characterized by strong social anchors of the vote.[1] And solutions are not easily available. Using propensity to vote (PTV) questions for each main party, treating these "party utilities" as dependent variables and turning the unit of analysis into a respondent/party combination, without imposing any aggregation or implied left-right structure in the dependent variable, is potentially one of those solutions (Van de Eijk and Franklin 1996; Van der Eijk 2002; and van der Eijk et al. 2006), which has been used in several studies of cleavage-voting (Van der Brug, Hobolt, and De Vreese 2009; Van der Brug 2010). However, PTV questions[2] are not available in most post-election surveys. The CSES surveys, in modules 1, 2 and 3, contain one set of questions that alluringly approximates a PTV measure, i.e., a set of like-dislike scores vis-à-vis all major parties in the party system.[3] However, as Van der Eijk and Marsh show (2007), like-dislike scores have much worse properties than PTV scores, especially in what concerns the absolutely central aspect of the relationship with actual vote choices. Alternatively, one could conceivably estimate different discrete choice models per election, again without imposing any aggregation or implied left-right structure in the dependent variable and then use measures of fit to compare countries. But unfortunately, although pseudo R-squares and other measures of fit are useful in comparing different discrete choice models predicting the same outcomes and using same samples, they do not provide comparable estimates across data sets and with different choice sets (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007).

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[1] One illustration of this problem can be found in Franklin (2009). Here, estimates of explained variance are provided for eleven European countries in several years using both linear probability models and OLS models where the dependent variable is the propensity to vote (PTV) for each main party. There is no single year in which the correlation between the two different measures of explained variance is higher than .41 (in 2004) and, in both 1989 and 1994, that correlation is, respectively, .03 and -.03 (and .30 in 1999). In 1999, for example, the Netherlands is, at the same time, the country where social cleavages explain the largest (.107, according to the model with the "left" dummy as DV) and the smallest (.033, according to the model with PTV as dependent variable) amount of the variance in the vote among the countries considered.

[2] One common way of formulating them, used in the European Election Studies, is: "We have a number of parties in [country] each of which would like to get your vote. How probable is it that you will ever vote for the following parties? Please specify your views on a 10-point-scalewhere 1 means "not at all probable" and 10 means "very probable".

The third problem with the "explained variance" strategy takes place when we try to adopt it as a measure of cleavage voting usable to compare countries and to test hypotheses about system-level characteristics that might account for variations between countries. The assumption here is that there is something like a generic "social anchoring" of the vote that might be accounted for features like, say, the electoral system or the level of social modernization of a particular country (Norris 2004). However, it is easy to see that although this might be true to some extent and for some system-level variables, it may not be the case for others. Vote choices in two different countries may be reasonably well predicted by the social characteristics of voters, but those characteristics and the reason they are important may be completely different. Take Belgium and the Netherlands, for example. Overall, using the PTV approach, we find that levels of variance explained by social characteristics of voters are comparatively large in both countries (Brug 2010). However, while parties in Belgium are closely aligned with voters on an ethno-linguistic basis and religiosity plays a largely irrelevant role in explaining vote choices, in the latter we find the exact opposite pattern (Brug et al. 2009; Huber 2011). If we are trying to explain cross-national variations in the social anchoring of the vote but find that the politically relevant social cleavages are so different, we should probably not assume that all the same system-level factors should be able to account for the same levels of explained variance in vote choices. Another interesting example of this is provided by the study of gender as a politically relevant social cleavage. In the United States, for example, the relationship between gender and vote has become increasingly strong, arguably due to a secular increase in female labor force participation, and it is even possible that this rise has also occurred as a response to a decline in other sources of party-societal alignments (Manza and Brooks 1998; Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza 2006). But if that's the case, it is possible that similar generic levels of "cleavage-voting" across countries conceal very different patterns of importance of, say, gender, religious, or class voting, making it unlikely that cross-national differences can be explained by the exact same factors.

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[3] "I'd like to know what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name of a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party. If I come to a party you haven't heard of or you feel you do not know enough about, just say so. The first party is PARTY A."

A final alternative would be to move away from "explained variance" and focus instead on effect size, i.e., on the size of the estimated parameters describing the relationship between the social demographic features of voters and their vote in discrete choice models. However, regardless of the already mentioned problems brought about by trying to force different choice sets in different party systems to the same measurement of the vote (say "party families" or "left-right"), two new problems emerge with this approach. First, although this would allows to examine the relationship between a particular variable and vote for different types of parties, there is no obvious way of aggregating such scores to get a generic country-specific measurement of, say, class or religious voting in a multiparty system. Second, effect sizes do not take group sizes into account. Imagine that in two countries, A and B, individuals with high frequency of religious attendance are, in comparison with others, three times more likely to vote for party family A instead of party family B. However, imagine also that party families A and B are very large in country 1 and very small in country 2. The previous finding, interesting as it is, would tell us very little about the overall anchoring of the vote in those countries in terms of religiosity. This was, in fact, the very reason why scholars focused on explained variance in the first place in order to examine patterns of cleavage voting across time and across countries (Franklin 2010). But as we arrive here, we are sent back to the beginning and all the problems involved in using explained variance as a measure of cleavage-voting.

2.2 A solution

Huber (2011), in the context of the cross-national study of ethnic voting, proposes a solution to these problems. Consider a country with Blue voters and Green voters, and three parties: Chocolate, Vanilla and Strawberry. How well can one predict whether a randomly selected voter will choose Chocolate, Vanilla or Strawberry on the basis of knowing whether that voter is Blue or Green? How can we measure the "color voting" phenomenon in this country?

Let us look at the different scenarios in Table 1. In scenario 1, the electorate is composed of 50% of Blue voters and 50% of Green voters, and the distribution of the vote for Chocolate (50%), Vanilla (40%), and Strawberry (10%) was the same for both groups of voters, causing the distribution of the national vote to be also the same. In this case, knowing whether a voter is Blue or Green does not improve our ability to predict her vote choice beyond what we would obtain with a mere guess based on the national distribution of the vote. Scenario 2, in contrast, provides us with a very different situation: all Blue voters chose Chocolate, while all Green voters chose Vanilla, and nobody chose Strawberry. Our indicator of "color voting" must award a minimum score to scenario 1 and a maximum score to scenario 2.

Table 1. Scenarios for estimation of cleavage-voting indices

		Chocolate	Vanilla	Strawberry	Total
Scenario 1	Blue (50% of voters)	50%	40%	10%	100%
	Green (50% of voters)	50%	40%	10%	100%
	All voters	*50%*	*40%*	*10%*	*100%*
Scenario 2	Blue (50% of voters)	100%	0%	0%	100%
	Green (50% of voters)	0%	100%	0%	100%
	All voters	*50%*	*50%*	*0%*	*100%*
Scenario 3	Blue (50% of voters)	80%	10%	10%	100%
	Green (50% of voters)	10%	80%	10%	100%
	All voters	*45%*	*45%*	*10%*	*100%*
Scenario 4	Blue (90% of voters)	80%	10%	10%	100%
	Green (10% of voters)	10%	80%	10%	100%
	All voters	*73%*	*17%*	*10%*	*100%*

Cleavages in the real-world between groups of voters are never as completely absent or so completely prevalent, so let's imagine something slightly less drastic than either of the two extreme situations. In scenarios 3 and 4, a large majority (80%) of Blue voters choose Chocolate, while 10% choose Vanilla and 10% choose Strawberry. And an equally strong majority of Green voters choose Vanilla, while Chocolate and Strawberry are chosen by 10% each of the Greens. Notice, however, an important difference between scenarios 3 and 4. In the former, Blues and Greens are equally sizeable segments of the electorate, while in the latter Greens represent a mere 10% of the voters. In scenario 4, Chocolate, of course, is the most chosen flavor, unlike what ends up happening in scenario 3. Any measure of "color voting" should desirably capture the difference between these two scenarios: although the way voters distribute themselves between the different options is the same, the fact that in scenario 4 the electorate is divided into an extremely small group and an extremely large one makes the voters' color – Blue or Green - overall less consequential than in the case where entire electorate is highly fractionalized between two equally large groups.

Huber's approach to the problem consists on drawing on the Gallagher's (1991) least-squares index to measure the disproportionality of election systems. However, instead of calculating differences between votes and seats for parties, Huber uses it to calculate indices capturing the difference between vote shares for the electorate as a whole (the "all voters" percentages in our Table 1) and vote shares for a particular group (say, the Blue voters' percentages). If V_g^j is the proportion of individuals in group g that supports party j, V_j the proportion of individuals in the electorate that support j, and p is the number of parties, then "cleavage voting" (in Huber's case, "ethnic voting") for a particular group is obtained by

$$CV_g = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}\sum_{j=1}^{p}(V_g^j - V_j)^2}$$

To obtain an overall measure of cleavage voting for the country as a whole, cleavage voting for each party can summed and weighted by the size of each group. If G is the number of groups and s_g the proportion of group g in the electorate, then

$$CV' = \sum_{g=1}^{G}(CV_g * s_g)$$

However, the theoretical maximum of CV' is below 1 and it is sensitive to number of groups. Thus, Huber proposes to weigh CV' by a function of the number of groups:

$$CV = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\frac{G-1}{2G}}}\sum_{g=1}^{G}(CV_g * s_g)$$

The properties of CV are particularly interesting for our purposes. First, it ranges from 0 to 1. In scenario 1 presented above, where there are no differences in the distribution of the vote between Blues and Greens, CV=0, while in scenario 2, where all members of one group vote for one party while all members of the other group vote for a different party, CV=1. Second, the measure is sensitive to group size. In scenario 3, where Blues and Greens represent equal proportions of the electorate, CV=.7, while in scenario 4, where the distributions of the vote within groups is the same but Greens are only 10% of the electorate, CV=.25. Finally, weighing by a function of the number of groups ensures that, for any number of groups, CV will be equal to 0 if the distribution of the vote for each group is the same.

While groups can be defined in ethnic or ethno-linguistic terms, they can also be defined in other ways. For example, members and non-members of unions form two groups, and Huber's measure can be used to assess the extent to which knowledge of membership of individuals in a union helps us predicting, in any given election, his or her vote choice. Take South Korea and Sweden, for example (Tables 2 and 3).

Table 2. Union membership and voting in South Korea (2004 legislative election)

	Grand National Party	Millennium Democratic Party	Our Party	United Liberal Democrats	National Integration 21	Democratic Labor Party
Union member (5%)	25.9%	3.7%	44.4%	1.9%	0%	24.1%
Non-member (95%)	33.3%	6.5%	45.2%	1.3%	0.1%	12.3%
All voters	*32.9%*	*6.4%*	*45.1%*	*1.3%*	*0.1%*	*12.9%*
$CV_{Unionmember}$				0.096		
$CV_{Nonmember}$				0.005		
CV'				0.010		
CV				**0.019**		

Table 3. Union membership and voting in Sweden (2001 legislative election)

	Left Party	Social Democrats	Centre Party	People's Party Liberals	Conservative Party	Christian Democrats	Green Party
Union member (63%)	11.6%	44.6%	4.4%	17.1%	9.1%	6.1%	5.9%
Non-member (37%)	5.5%	27.6%	6.1%	19.4%	18.8%	13.7%	7.6%
All voters	*9.4%*	*38.4%*	*5.0%*	*18.0%*	*12.6%*	*8.9%*	*6.5%*
$CV_{Unionmember}$				0.057			
$CV_{Nonmember}$				0.100			
CV'				0.073			
CV				**0.145**			

In South Korea, on the basis of the CSES module 2 survey conducted after the 2004 legislative election, we can see in Table 2 that although union members were more likely to vote for the Democratic Labor Party and less likely to vote for the (formerly called) Millennium Democratic Party than non-members, differences between members and nonmembers for the remaining parties (who received in total more than 80% of the vote) are relatively small. Furthermore, union members make up a very small percentage of the sample of voting electorate, only 5%. As a result, CV, representing in this case "union voting", amounts just to .019. In contrast, the 2001 post-electoral survey in Sweden (Table 3) reveals – with little surprise - much clearer differences. Union members were more likely to vote for the Social Democrats and the Left Party in comparison with non-members, while the later were much more supportive of the Conservatives and the Christian Democrats. Besides, about two-thirds of the voting electorate reported belonging to a union. Having said that, we are very far from union membership allowing us to perfectly predict the Swedish vote. While more than 40% of union members reported voting for a center-right party, more than 30% of non-members voted for either the Social Democrats or the Left Party. As a result, our "union voting" index in Sweden reaches .145, much more than in South Korea, but very far from suggesting that union membership perfectly predicts voting choices.

Men and women form two groups. Individuals defined in terms of the frequency of their religious attendance can also be thought of as forming groups, and the same occurs with those belonging to different social classes. Thus, using Huber's measure, we can extend our analysis to other manifestations of cleavage-voting. But what should we expect to find if we do that? This is the issue addressed in the next section.

3. Why system-level differences in the social anchoring of the vote?

What are the political, institutional, and social macro-level factors that may explain why, in some countries, the social characteristics of voters may be better predictors of the vote than in others? To put it differently, what might explain why the vote is more socially anchored in some contexts than in others?

3.1 Social modernization

A first hypothesis relates social modernization to a diminished importance of "cleavage-voting". As the argument goes, modernization has brought about changes in the class structure and new forms of social stratification that are thought to generate new conflicts of interests, to disturb previous alignments between parties and social groups, and to weaken ties between individuals and those organizations – such as churches or unions - that in the past had given expression to collective identities and worked as intermediaries between parties and society (Dalton, Flanagan. and Beck 1984; Clark and Lipset 2001; Dalton 2002; Norris 2002). Modernization also comes with changes such as secularization, the increase of the skills and cognitive mobilization of citizens, and, thus, changes in their generic values and attitudes towards politics, leading to the emergence of new value conflicts that cross-cut previous alignments and undercut the impact of social cleavages - such as class or religion - in the vote. Although there is disagreement on the real nature of those new value cleavages,[4] it is relatively clear that they generically flow from the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies and economies.

As it was formulated, this generic hypothesis is mainly an account of one of possible reasons why cleavage-voting is thought to have experienced a secular decline in a particular set of advanced post-industrial democracies. But it has also been extended to become a hypothesis about what may explain cross-national differences in this respect: in more modern societies, voting choices should be less anchored in traditional social cleavages (Norris 2004). Support for this hypothesis, however, has remained limited. In what remains, to our knowledge, the broadest cross-national comparison in the literature, Norris compared the strength of "cleavage politics" – as captured by the explained variance in an ordinal measure of "left-right vote" by a model containing variables measuring age, gender, education, income, union membership, religiosity and belonging to a "linguistic majority" – in 37 elections that took place between 1996 and 2002 in 32 countries, using the CSES module 1 data. However, instead of lower levels of explained variance in the "post-industrial" societies, Norris finds, in fact, that the explanatory power of social characteristics of voters was, on average, higher in the post-industrial than in the industrial democracies. Of course, the fact that the models were not the same in all countries and elections – with union membership, religiosity, or belonging to a linguistic majority missing on some of them –, the inclusion of left-right self-placement as part of this "social cleavage" model, and all the considerations raised in the previous section suggest doubts about the soundness of the comparisons made by Norris and what they are really capturing. In any case, however, the main point is that, even with the use of a (comparatively large) set of countries, support for a modernization theory of cross-national differences in cleavage voting has not been found.

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[4] See, for example, Inglehart and Rabier (1986) and Inglehart (1997), on the one hand, and Kitschelt (1994) and Kriesi (1998), on the other.

3.2 Consensual democracy

Lipset and Rokkan pointed out that, to a great extent, institutional rules were shaped by the configuration of interests in society. The choice of an electoral system is to a large extent, a reflection of existing cleavages and of the efforts of established parties to "consolidate their position" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 30). However, they also provided illustrations as to how variations in the openness of political institutions ended up, in turn, affected the incentives of political and social actors to engage in alliances or to preserve pre-existing divisions, and thus the particular shape of party systems and party alignments with society. Electoral rules, for example, by imposing different thresholds for political representation of emerging social movements, created different incentives for alliances with already established parties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 31). Similarly, they called attention to the extent to which particular "traditions of decision-making" – more or less centralized, more of less accommodating of conflicts - affected the likelihood that new inputs into the political system might be converted into policy and, thus, more or less confrontational and divisive strategies of emerging social interests and movements (1967: 26). In sum, even the seminal formulation of social cleavage theory was willing to concede something that later research was to establish rather more clearly: that the nature of the party system is the result of a interaction between pre-existing cleavage structures and the established rules (Ordeshook and Shvestova, 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997).

Modern thinking about institutional rules has helped making the connection between them and cleavage-voting more clear. For example, majoritarian electoral systems are thought to give incentives to parties to extend their electoral appeals beyond the confines of narrowly defined social groups in order to secure electoral majorities (Horowitz 1993; Norris 2004). Conversely, if more permissive electoral rules allow parties to form and survive by exploring electoral niches – as it is the case in PR – the politicization of social divisions and clear alignments between parties and social groups become more likely, as so does cleavage-voting. And to the extent that electoral rules affect the number of parties, the potential for cleavage-voting is also affected: with less parties, the existence of cross-cleavages becomes more likely, leading parties to deemphasize some of those cleavages and to blur conflicts in those dimensions where their bases are divided (Zielinski 2002).

More generally, it could be argued that particular "types" of democracy are more favorable to generate socially homogeneous party constituencies. Lijphart's seminal distinction between majoritarian and consensual democracies (Lijphart 1984; 1999) suggests that electoral laws combine with other institutional features to form two different types of democracy, majoritarian and consensual, organized around the basic principles of, respectively, concentration of power and its diffusion. PR systems, high party system fractionalization, strong parliaments and coalition cabinets all tend to go together and to foster diffusion of power, while majoritarian electoral systems, low party system fractionalization, weak "arena" parliaments and majority government foster concentration of power. Generally speaking, the notion of "concentration of power" seems generally inimical of the preservation of party appeals directed at particular social groups: the more the system is governed by a winner-take-all logic - with little room for accommodating minority interests through participation in the executive and lack of institutional and partisan checks on executive power – the more parties are left with little avenues to seek their goals besides pure electoral victory, which in turn requires the abandonment of narrow appeals aimed at mobilizing particular social segments of the electorate. Thus, consensual systems and its components should be related to strong cleavage-voting.

What has been found empirically? Dalton finds a relationship between the number of parties and "class voting": the larger the level of party fractionalization, the stronger the relationship between social class and vote choice (Dalton 2008). More generally, Norris (2004) shows that, under majoritarian electoral systems, structural features of voters tend to explain less variance in the vote. However, not all findings point in this general direction. Huber (2011), for example, in the context of the study of ethnic voting, finds it to be weaker in PR systems and than in majoritarian systems. His speculation is that this results precisely from how easy it is, in PR systems, to mobilize voters on different issues. Given the heterogeneity of preferences in members of any social group, parties aiming to attract voters on the basis of an ethnic appeal soon find competition from other parties who try to attract them on the basis of other appeals, something that contributes to "diffuse the cohesiveness of group voting behavior" (Huber 2011). In sum, again, as it occurred in the case of the social modernization hypothesis, empirical evidence concerning the relationship between "consensual" political institutions (and some of its components, such as the electoral system and party system) remains contradictory.

3.3 Presidentialism

As far as I know, there is a third hypothesis that has not been systematically investigated, and it is one relating presidentialism to a lower social anchoring of the vote. Of course, some of the possible consequences of presidentialism are, in a sense, already captured by the notion of "consensual" vs. "majoritarian" democracy. If we focus strictly on executive power, presidentialism's majoritarian election rules and unipersonal executive office already ensure that it is majoritarian by definition, and whatever effects we expect of majoritarian institutions on cleavage voting would not require consideration of "presidentialism" per se.

However, I suggest that there might be additional consequences of presidentialism that, in comparison with parliamentary systems – regardless of whether they are majoritatian or consensual – are likely to make cleavage-voting less prevalent. The crucial aspect concerns the separate origin and survival of the executive in relation to the legislature. This has two sorts of consequences for establishment of links between social groups and parties. First, in presidential systems, voters are systematically exposed to two different sorts of electoral appeal: from parties, in legislative elections, and from presidential candidates, in presidential elections. Given the incentives provided by the majority rule for their election, policy positions and electoral appeals on the part of presidential candidates tend to be more personalized, more centrist and more aimed at the median voter (Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009). However, if any contamination between party appeals in legislative elections and candidate appeals in presidential elections is to be expected, it is one where legislative elections become "presidentialized". As Samuels and Shugart (2010) show, in the rare instances where we able to observe moves from pure parliamentary regimes to rules that promote a separation between origin and/or survival of the executive and legislature, what we tend to observe is a move in the organization and behavior of parties that leads – at least for the larger parties - towards greater "vote-seeking" strategies, greater personalization of politics, and a lower importance of ideology in legislative elections than what would happen in a parliamentary system. The majoritarian logic of presidentialism tends to contaminate legislative politics and elections, even if the particularly institutional rules that govern legislative elections escape that logic.

Second, independently of the well-known effects of electoral systems from that point of view, separate origin and survival of executives and legislatures also means that party unity and loyalty become less important, giving MP's and parliamentary candidates less incentives to behave cohesively and breaking linkages not only between legislators but also between them and the party leadership (Carey and Shugart 1995). From this point of view, what presidentialism does to electoral party politics is to give greater incentives for candidates to differentiate themselves from each other and to serve their specific constituencies, rather than adopting national party platforms and build linkages with broadly defined social groups and interests. In other words, presidentialism leads, from this point of view, to greater intraparty divergence, to "personal vote" and to a low level of nationalization of politics (Carey and Shugary 1995; Morgenstern and Swindle 2005; Morgenstern, Swindle, and Castagnola 2009). Either development – the "presidentialization" of parties or the "localization" of candidates – is inimical to the establishment of strong and stable links between parties and social groups. Thus, we should expect that presidential systems are characterized by lower levels of cleavage-voting.

3.4 New vs. Established Democracies

A final generic hypothesis relates experience with democracy (or timing of democratization) with the social anchoring of the vote. Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) propose two mechanisms through which one country's democratization may influence the extent to which parties are able build stable alignments with voters, thus diminishing electoral volatility. One argument is simply that, the longer the experience with democratic political competition, the more likely it is that individuals form stable partisan attachments and "that parties win over some relatively stable clientele groups, routinize their electoral appeals and build a more stable base" (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007: 161). In other words, countries with a longer experience under democratic rule should exhibit lower levels of electoral volatility, and one of the reasons why that should occur is that the mere passage of time under democratic partisan competition helps forging stable alignments between parties and their social clienteles.

The second mechanism relates the existence of such alignments not to the length of democratic experience in any given moment but rather to the *timing* of democratization. The alignments between voters and parties that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) described in their classic piece were forged in a particular historical period and set of countries experiencing an opening up of their political structures to competition and participation as they were undergoing crucial "national revolutions". In those cases, parties became both the main vehicles for the aggregation of social preferences and the source of social and political identities, reinforced by socialization and links to organizations such as churches and unions (Pizzorno 1981). "The stronger loyalties and organizations in the earlier cases of democratization helped parties build deep roots in society and helped stabilize patterns of interparty competition" (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007: 166). In contrast, countries that have democratized later have done so in very different social and political contexts. In these countries – so-called "Third Wave" democracies – new democratic parties after the emergence of modern mass media - particularly television - as the main channels of political intermediation, the less central role of parties in the expansion of citizenship, and their emergence in a context of already weakened links between individuals and secondary organizations (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005: 209; see also Scarrow 2010). As a consequence, party system institutionalization, citizens' attachments to existing parties, and the social anchoring of the vote is likely to be lower in "third wave" democracies.

4. Cleavage-voting in 34 elections

For this analysis, we use 34 post-election surveys conducted in 33 countries, which are contained in the CSES module 2 dataset. We have not considered elections that have taken place in non-democratic regimes, which lead to the exclusion of Kyrgyzstan, Hong-Kong, and Russia. Furthermore, we study here exclusively legislative elections, which led to the exclusion of the presidential election surveys in Chile and Peru.

We focus our analysis on the class cleavage and on its "organizational dimension", i.e., trade union membership) the religious cleavage; and the gender cleavage. Ideally, to get a broader view of cleavage-voting and to replicate Huber's findings, one would like to be able to include a measure of ethnic voting too. However, a question about ethnicity was asked in only 16 of our 34 election surveys, which forced us to exclude ethnic voting from the analysis. Conversely, of the 34 CSES surveys, all contained a question determining whether the respondent belonged to a trade union. Socio-economic status is measured by a nominal variable with four categories, based on answers to questions about the respondent's occupation. The four categories are "white-collar" (non-manual employees), "worker" (workers engaged in manual labor), "self-employed" (covering entrepreneurs, shop-keepers and professionals), and farmers. This variable was available for 28 of the 34 elections considered. Admittedly, this is far from being a very nuanced social stratification measure, something that we should take into account when analyzing our measure of "class voting" and comparing to other indices, but which in any case it does capture the basic distinction between manual and non-manual workers so often employed in many studies.

In what concerns religiosity, we faced two data problems. First, in several countries, the church attendance question was not asked in the survey. Second, in some of those where the question was indeed asked, the scales used to measure church attendance were different. Therefore, we distinguish simply between individuals who report attending religious services at least once a week (coded as 1) from all other individuals (coded as 0). And in the surveys where no church attendance question was asked but a religiosity question was ("How religious are you?"), we coded as 1 those who responded "very religious". Overall, only in two of the 34 countries – Norway and Taiwan – were we left without any way to distinguish highly religious individuals from others. Finally, we look at gender, for which we have measures in all 34 surveys.

Table 4 displays 128 indices: 34 of gender and union voting; 32 of religious voting; and 28 of class (or more appropriately, "socio-economic status") voting. To improve readability of these 128 indices, the table also works as a "heat map" where higher indices are displayed with stronger colors. Purely for presentational purposes, countries are sorted by average levels of cleavage-voting, although we should be aware that, for some countries, there are missing cases.

Table 4. Cleavage-voting in 34 elections

	Class	Union membership	Religiosity	Gender
Czech Rep.	0.14	0.06	0.15	0.12
Sweden	0.2	0.15	0.04	0.07
Finland	0.18	0.09	0.1	0.04
Switzerland		0.11	0.12	0.06
Norway	0.1	0.09		0.09
Italy	0.12	0.08	0.08	0.07
Poland	0.12	0.04	0.13	0.06
Israel	0.07	0.07	0.13	0.06
Hungary	0.08	0.1	0.11	0.04
Canada	0.06	0.06	0.15	0.05
Japan	0.12	0.06	0.08	0.06
Netherlands	0.07	0.06	0.14	0.06
Slovenia		0.02	0.13	0.08
Albania	0.11	0.04	0.05	0.11
Spain	0.14	0.02	0.12	0.02
Germany	0.08	0.08	0.1	0.03
Iceland	0.1	0.06	0.01	0.12
New Zealand	0.06	0.07	0.1	0.06
Belgium	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.04
Australia	0.06	0.14	0.04	0.03
USA	0.07	0.05	0.09	0.04
Portugal 05		0.06	0.09	0.03
Ireland	0.08	0.04	0.1	0.03
UK	0.08	0.1	0.02	0.04
Portugal 02	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.03
Denmark	0.11	0.04	0.01	0.06
Romania		0.06	0.04	0.06
Brazil	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.05
France		0.04	0.05	0.05
Taiwan	0.05	0.04		0.04
Mexico	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.03
Korea	0.08	0.02	0.01	0.05
Philippines	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.02
Bulgaria		0.01	0.05	0.04

🟥
0.15
🟧
0.1
🟨
0.05
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The first thing that becomes visible even with a cursory observation of Table 4 is the fact that some countries seem to display either consistently high or consistently low levels of cleavage voting. Although, on the basis of what was said before in terms of measurement problems, we should be wary on relying on most previous broad ranging comparisons, the fact that Switzerland, Norway, Israel or the Netherlands, for example, emerge with comparatively high levels of cleavage-voting in all dimensions, or that the Czech Republic also stands out among Eastern European countries in this respect, is not particularly surprising in the light of previous studies (Norris 2004; Brug 2010). Conversely, countries such as Taiwan, Korea, and Mexico appear here, as in other studies (Norris 2004), with consistently very low levels of cleavage-voting. This suggests the possibility that some common underlying factors may driving the social anchoring of the electorate down or up, regardless of the particular cleavage one is talking about.

However, the second main point that comes out of Table 4 is that generic measures of "cleavage-voting" are likely to miss out on relevant differences between the importance of cleavages in different countries. In Sweden or Australia, for example, where union membership appears as a comparatively strong predictor of the vote, religiosity seems to be of little consequence. In the cases such as Poland, Slovenia, Spain, and Ireland, the exact opposite takes place. Gender is a comparatively important cleavage in countries such as Norway and the Czech Republic, where other social characteristics are also strongly related to vote choices. But it is also important in countries such as Albania or Iceland, where religiosity is mostly unrelated to the vote. And while class voting seems to remain, comparatively speaking, at least moderately relevant in all countries, there are some where union membership, religiosity or gender seem to be wholly unrelated to vote choice. In fact, overall, the aggregate-level relationships between our indices of class, union membership, religiosity and gender voting are all relatively weak. The correlation between class and gender voting is .38, and all other intercorrelations are much lower and lack statistical significance. In sum, this suggests that a separate analysis of the different cleavages is necessary.

We regressed our four indicators on a basic set of four system-level variables. In the previous section, we advanced four basic hypotheses: social modernization and development, consensual democracy, presidentialism and age of democracy. The argument that cleavage voting should be lower in highly developed democracies is tested by using GDP per capita at constant 2000 US dollars for each election year in each country (source: World Bank, World Development Indicators). Since the variable is high skewed - ranging from $1,073 (Philippines, 2005) to $38,246 (Japan, 2004) – we use the natural log of GDP per capita. The hypothesis that consensual democracies should favor a stronger politicization of social divisions is tested by using an indicator of consensual democracy developed by Vatter and Bernauer (2011; see also Vatter 2009 and Vatter and Bernauer 2009). Building on the work by Lijphart (2009), Vatter and Bernauer extended the same analysis to a larger set of countries and built indices of consensual democracy. We use their "Consensual democracy on the executive-parties dimension" index, which is constructed by adding standardized score of variables capturing the disproportionality of the electoral system, the effective number of parliamentary parties, the dominance of the executive over the legislature and frequency of oversized and minority coalitions in each country in the period from 1997 up to the date of each election. Values range from -2.33 (United Kingdom) to 1.79 (Belgium). Presidentialism's effect over cleavage voting is assessed by using a dummy variable with value 1 for Brazil, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines and the United States. Years of democracy captures the number of years since 1955 a country has score + 6 or above on Polity IV's democracy scale up until the election year (taken from CSES module 2 macro-level dataset – Bargsted et al. 2009). Values range from 51 (Italy) to 6 (Mexico) years. Finally, for the case of gender voting, we added a variable capturing female labor participation rate in each country-year (World Bank, World Development Indicators) and its purported relationship with higher levels of gender voting (Manza and Brooks 1998). Value range from 38% (Italy) to 75% (Iceland). We standardized all variables to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 to and used OLS to regress each cleavage-voting indicators on those standardized scores, allowing direct comparison of the coefficients. Results are presented in two ways: first in Table 5 and then in Figure 1, a dot plot where coefficients and 90% confidence intervals can be visually assessed.

Table 5. The determinants of cleavage-voting

	Class	Union membership	Religiosity	Gender
(ln) GDP per capita	.003	.001	.013	.001
	(.009)	(.005)	(.011)	(.006)
Consensual democracy	.014*	.003	.008	.008***
	(.007)	(.006)	(.009)	(.002)
Presidentialism	-.009**	-.007**	-.015**	-.007**
	(.010)	(.003)	(.007)	(.003)
Years of democracy	-.006	.015**	-.015	-.011
	(.012)	(.006)	(.012)	(.007)
Female labor participation	-	-	-	.013**
				(.006)
Constant	.098***	.065***	.078***	.085***
	(.006)	(.005)	(.007)	(.004)
N	28	34	32	34
R-squared	.23	.36	.19	.38

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; OLS with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Independent variables standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.



Figure 1. Dot plot of the coefficient estimates presented in table 5. Error bars represent 90% confidence intervals.

The results show that the hypothesis relating presidentialism with lower levels of cleavage voting is supported in all cases. The coefficients are precisely estimated and all negative, as expected. In what concerns consensual democracy, coefficients are significant in two cases: class voting and gender voting. In other words, countries with more consensual political institutions – with more permissive electoral systems, larger number of parties, lower levels of executive dominance and more frequent power-sharing arrangements in power – also clearly tend to be the cases where class and gender are better predictors of vote choices. However, the coefficients for religious and union membership, although not significant, are also positive, as expected. In sum, political institutions seem to be highly consequential for the social anchoring of vote.

The contrast with what occurs in the case of the social modernization argument is starkly clear. The hypothesis that higher levels of economic development with lower levels of cleavage voting needs to be rejected: there are three cases – class, union membership, and gender voting – where the coefficients are very close to zero and, in the case of religiosity, the coefficient is actually positive, although not statistically significant with p<.10. This does not mean that socio-structural features are irrelevant: clearly, the entrance of women in the labor market seems to be related to higher levels of gender voting, as Manza and Brooks (1998) suggested for the case of the United States.

Results for age of democracy are more intriguing. On the one hand, as expected, the relationship between union membership and the vote is stronger in older and more established democracies. On the other hand, however, the coefficients associated to age of democracy are actually *negative* for the remaining cases, and actually close to conventional levels of statistical significance in the cases of gender, suggesting the possibility that while the organizational expression of the class cleavage – union membership – is still a relevant phenomenon in older democracies, younger democracies may tend to be characterized by different politically relevant social divisions, such as the ones based on gender.

One further possibility explored is that “consensual democracy” might be too much of an over-aggregation of different dimensions of politics, and that the most frequent argument made concerning institutions and cleavage-voting concerned, in fact, the effect of electoral system permissiveness. We tested this possibiliby replacing the Vatter and Bernauer’s index of (executives-parties) consensual democracy with a measure of electoral system magnitude extracted from the “New Electoral Systems Dataset: Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote” (Johnson and Wallack 2007): the (log of) the number of legislators elected in the average district in a country. As we can see in Table, results are not improved. In the only country where the variable remains significant (gender voting), its impact dropped to half the size of consensual democracy’s, and the fit of the models is now worse. In sum, there’s something that power-sharing institutions do to promote cleavage-voting – and it does seems that they do, at least in the cases of class and gender voting – that it is probably not through electoral system permissiveness and proportionality.[5]

Table 6. The determinants of cleavage-voting, with average district magnitude

	Class	Union memb.	Religiosity	Gender
(ln) GDP per capita	.001	.001	.013	.001
	(.009)	(.005)	(.012)	(.006)
(ln) Average district magnitude	.007	-.002	.006	.004*
	(.008)	(.005)	(.009)	(.002)
Presidentialism	-.010**	-.008**	-.015*	-.007**
	(.004)	(.003)	(.008)	(.003)
Years of democracy	-.001	.015**	-.013	-.008
	(.013)	(.005)	(.013)	(.008)
Female labor participation	-	-	.	.012*
				(.006)
Constant	.094***	.062***	.078***	.054***
	(.007)	(.005)	(.007)	(.004)
N	28	34	32	34
R-squared	.12	.36	.18	.31

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; OLS with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Independent variables standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.

5. Conclusion

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) are often presented as the seminal source for a kind of “sociological” approach to the explanation of party systems, through which the emergence of parties, their positions, and the overall shape of the party system are seen as reflection of the composition of social groups and the main social cleavages in society. However, as Franklin reminds us, this does not do entire justice to Lipset and

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[5] I also ran models using a simple dummy variable distinguishing majoritarian from PR systems, but the results were even worse.

Rokkan's thinking: they "expressly recognized that different party systems in different countries resulted from different historical developments and different institutional settings" (Franklin 2010: 655). Among those institutional settings, electoral and policy-making rules and norms played, according to them, a very important role (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 26-31). Thus, if such factors were consequential for the formation of voter-party alignments in early decades of the 20th century, there are good reasons to believe not only that their legacies might still be visible, as Lipset and Rokkan argued was still the case in the late 1960s, but also that they may continue to be relevant for how parties appeal to particular segments of society and how voters respond to those appeals.

What we found was that cross-national differences in the extent to which voting behavior is socially anchored seem indeed to be strongly related to institutional factors. One of those factors - in fact the most important and systematically operative - is one that, given the Western European bent of most comparative studies on the decline of cleavage voting, had not been examined yet: presidentialism. Institutional rules that create a separation between the origin and survival of parliaments and executives seem to create disincentives for the adoption, in legislative elections, of appeals to socially defined and rooted groups of voters, thus promoting greater social heterogeneity of party constituencies. The second institutional factor is consensual democracy. However, our results in this respect suggest the need for further research in this regard. On the one hand, although the coefficients associated to consensual democracy are all positive, only two were significant at conventional levels, those related to status and gender voting. On the other hand, what has been treated by the literature so far as the crucial aspect of consensual democracy in this respect – electoral system permissiveness – does not seem to be the decisive component. This, together with the finding of Huber (2010) concerning ethnic voting's negative relationship with the amount of ethnic voting, suggest the need to rethink hypotheses concerning the direct effect of electoral system rules and direct them towards other aspects of power-sharing.

On the other hand, we found no relationship between socio-economic development and the amount of cleavage voting in our countries. To be sure, this does not mean that societal features and transformations are unrelated to the extent to which social cleavages become politicized. First, as we saw, the integration of women in the labor market, which has taken places at different levels in different countries regardless of levels of economic development, seems to be related to greater amounts of gender voting, as previous studies on the United States suggested it might be. Second, what extant findings concerning the importance of social modernization show is that *within-country* changes in the composition of social classes, in occupational structures, in the role of the church and unions and in the cognitive skills of individuals have decreased the extent to which parties are able to align with social groups. What this study shows is simply that these hypotheses do not necessarily travel well to explain *between-country* differences in cleavage-voting. For that purpose, institutional rules and the incentives that generate seem much more promising approaches.

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